Trust-Aware Network Utility Optimization in Multihop Wireless Networks
  with Delay Constraints by Paraskevas, Evripidis et al.
Trust-Aware Network Utility Optimization in
Multihop Wireless Networks with Delay Constraints
Evripidis Paraskevas∗, Tao Jiang† and John S. Baras∗
∗Department of Electrical & Computer Eng. and Institute for Systems Research,
University of Maryland, College Park, MD, USA
†Samsung Research America-Dallas, Richardson, TX, USA
Email: {evripar, baras}@umd.edu, t.jiang@sta.samsung.com
Abstract—Many resource allocation problems can be formu-
lated as a constrained maximization of a utility function. Network
Utility Maximization (NUM) applies optimization techniques to
achieve decomposition by duality or the primal-dual method.
Several important problems, for example joint source rate
control, routing, and scheduling design, can be optimized by
using this framework. In this work, we introduce an important
network security concept, “trust”, into the NUM formulation and
we integrate nodes’ trust values in the optimization framework.
These trust values are based on the interaction history between
network entities and community based monitoring. Our objective
is to avoid routing packets though paths with large percentage
of malicious nodes. We also add end-to-end delay constraints for
each of the traffic flows. The delay constraints are introduced
to capture the quality of service (QoS) requirements imposed to
each traffic flow.
Index Terms—cross-layer optimization, trust, source rate con-
trol, multipath routing, scheduling
I. INTRODUCTION
The problem of resource allocation in wireless networks has
been a growing area of research over the past decade. Recent
advances in the area of network utility maximization (NUM)
driven cross-layer design [1], [2], [3] have led to efforts on
top-down development of next generation wireless network
architectures. By linking decomposition of the NUM problem
to different layers of the network stack, we are able to design
protocols, based on the optimal NUM derived algorithms,
which provide much better performance gain over the current
network protocols.
Traditionally, network protocols are strictly layered. Source
rate control, routing and scheduling (e.g. back-pressure
scheduling [4]) are implemented independently at different
layers. In order to achieve high performance and efficient
resource utilization, these protocols should be jointly designed
while the layered structure is preserved. However, the nature
of wireless multihop networks imposes new challenges to
this cross-layer design, since the wireless channel is a shared
medium where the transmissions of users interfere with each
other. The channel capacity is “elastic” (time-varying) and the
contention over such shared and limited network resources
provides a fundamental constraint for resource allocation. All
these challenges cause interdependencies across users and
network layers. In spite of these difficulties, there have been
significant developments in optimization-based approaches
that result in loosely coupled cross-layer solutions [5].
In recent years, network security has become increasingly
important in the context of wireless multihop networks. Dif-
ferent types of network attacks can be released and affect
significantly their performance. In our work, we consider that
the adversary is capable of releasing some form of denial of
service (DoS) attack. Hence, without proper security consid-
eration, the network operation is possible to be disrupted. To
capture the notion of security, we use “trust weights” [6] in the
network utility optimization process. These weights indicate
whether a network entity (node) is malicious or not, based on
its interactions with the other network entities. Thus, by using
them, we enhance the correct operation of the network and its
resilience to attacks. The trust weights are developed by our
network community based on monitoring and are disseminated
via efficient methods so that they are timely available to all
nodes that need them [7].
End-to-end delay is a critical quality of service (QoS)
requirement for resource-constrained wireless networks. Net-
work applications, served from different traffic flows in the
wireless network, have different delay requirements. For ex-
ample, video streaming applications are time-critical and have
strict delay requirements. Hence, it is crucial to take into
account these delay constraints, corresponding to different
classes of traffic flows, to our trust-aware NUM problem.
In this paper, we incorporate the notion of security into the
NUM problem, by using the trust values of the network nodes.
Users get higher utility, when they relay packets though trusted
paths. Hence, our proposed trust-aware NUM process ensures
that untrusted paths (with malicious entities) will not receive
high traffic rate. We also add end-to-end delay constraints
in the NUM problem based on [8]. These delay constraints
indicate the QoS requirements of the different traffic flows.
The notion of link capacity margin [8] is used to control the
end-to-end delay. Finally, we propose a distributed cross-layer
optimization algorithm for the trust-aware NUM problem with
delay constraints. The distributed algorithm is based on the
dual decomposition into source rate control, average end-to-
end delay control and scheduling subproblems.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II
reviews the related work in the literature on network utility
maximization (NUM) problem formulation and its security
considerations. Section III introduces the system model that
we consider in this paper, including the network model, the ad-
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versary model, the trust values estimation, and the interference
model. Section IV outlines the optimization constraints, which
include link capacity, average end-to-end delay, and scheduling
constraints, as well as the primal optimization problem. The
dual function and its decomposition into different subproblems
is studied in Section V. Section V-D discusses the distributed
algorithm for solving the network utility maximization (NUM)
problem. The simulation results for our proposed trust-aware
NUM problem with delay constraints are shown in Section VI.
Section VII concludes this paper and discusses future work.
II. RELATED WORK
Network utility maximization (NUM) problems have been
investigated widely during recent years. Most of works [1],
[2], [3], [5] focus on using NUM for cross-layer optimization.
Chiang et. al [1] introduced a methodology for optimizing
functional modules of the network, such as congestion control,
routing and scheduling, through optimization decomposition.
Chen et. al [2] proposed a subgradient algorithm for cross-
layer optimization and its extension to time-varying channels
and adaptive multi-rate devices. The proposed solution in most
of these works depends on the decomposition of the dual
function to different subproblems. Decomposition methods for
NUM problem are proposed in [9].
Several works have introduced delay considerations for the
traffic flows into the NUM problem formulation. Trichakis et.
al [10] proposed a dynamic NUM formulation with delivery
contracts for the different traffic flows. Delivery contracts
ensure that some quantity of a traffic flow will be delivered
during a time interval. One other concept for delay, used for
the NUM problem, is the link capacity margins, which we use
in our work. These margins were introduced in [8] and [11]
to control the average end-end delay. Link margins represent
the estimated delay of the link, because higher link margin
indicates lower link congestion and thus less delay.
As far as we are concerned, there are not a lot of works that
relate security with the NUM problem [12], [13]. Tague et.
al [13] proposed a jamming-aware throughput maximization
approach. The authors estimate the effect of jamming on
packet delivery ratio. Then, they use these jamming estimates
in the NUM problem to allocate data traffic appropriately
in order to achieve throughput maximization. They adopt
an objective function, based on portfolio selection theory to
maximize throughput for the different source nodes.
To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first to study
trust-aware network utility maximization problems. Trust val-
ues affect the outcome of the NUM process and make it
resilient to malicious nodes’ behavior.
III. SYSTEM MODEL
A. Network Model
We consider a multihop wireless network that can be defined
by a graph G(N ,L). The vertex set N represents the wireless
network nodes. The edge set L represents the wireless links.
An ordered pair of nodes (i, j) belongs to the edge set L
if and only if node j can receive data packets directly from
Fig. 1: Network with two alternative paths for traffic flow from s to d.
node i. For simplicity, we also use the symbol ` to denote a
wireless link. We assume that all node-to-node communication
is unicast, i.e. each packet transmitted by a node i ∈ N
is intended for a unique j ∈ N with (i, j) ∈ L. Each of
the wireless links has a maximum capacity denoted by ci,j .
The interference constraints among transmission links will be
described in a later subsection.
There is a set F of network traffic flows that share the
wireless network resources and each flow f ∈ F is associated
with a source node s. Each source node s in a subset S ⊆ N
generates data packets for a single destination node ds ∈ N .
We assume that each source node s constructs multiple routing
paths with multiple hops to ds in order to distribute the
traffic demand and satisfy the flow related QoS requirements.
We denote as Ps = {ps1, . . . , psPs} the collection of the
alternative paths Ps that can be used to route packets from
s to ds. Each path psk ∈ Ps is specified by a subset of
wireless links and is assumed to be loop-free. An example
of two different paths ps1 and ps2 from s to ds is shown in
Figure 1, where
ps1 = {(s, 1), (1, 2), (2, 3), (3, ds)}
ps2 = {(s, 1), (1, 4), (4, 5), (5, ds)}
Let xs denote the Ps × 1 traffic rate vector with which data
packets are sent from s to ds over multiple paths psk ∈ Ps,
and multiple hops. Each component of the vector xsk denotes
the proportion of traffic rate allocated to the corresponding
path psk, which routes data packets from source node s to
destination ds. The total data rate of the source s is given by
the summation of xsk over k = 1, . . . , Ps.
We assume that the traffic rate vector xs of each flow is
constrained to a non-negative orthant. The traffic rate allocated
to each traffic flow should also not exceed a maximum data
rate Rs. Therefore, each of the traffic rate vectors xs should
satisfy the following constraints
xs ≥ 0 ,∀s ∈ S (1)
1Txs ≤ Rs ,∀s ∈ S (2)
In Eq. (1) each component of the vector is nonnegative. These
constraints define the convex set Xs of feasible traffic rate
vectors xs for source node s.
We denote by Rs = [(Rs)k(i,j)](Ps×|L|) the routing matrix
that indicates the different paths from source node s to
destination ds. Element (Rs)k(i,j) of the routing matrix is
defined as follows
(Rs)k(i,j) =
{
1, if psk passes through link (i, j).
0, otherwise.
(3)
B. Security Considerations: Adversary Model and Trust
In this paper, we study the network utility optimization
problem with considerations of network security. All previous
works on the network utility maximization (NUM) problems
assume that nodes operate correctly. For example, intermediate
nodes successfully forward all packets, and they follow the
routing and scheduling protocols. However, nodes do not
always function correctly in reality. They may be compro-
mised by attackers, their communication may be blocked or
interfered by attackers, or they may just be misconfigured.
Wireless networks are especially vulnerable to attacks because
of the inherent properties of the shared wireless medium.
Therefore, we believe it is crucial to take the security aspect
into consideration in the NUM problems. We are going to
define the adversary model, which describes the capabilities
of an adversarial node, and the notion of trust, which indicates
whether a node can be considered as trustworthy based on its
observed behavior.
Adversary Model: We assume that the adversarial node is
not following the network protocol and attempts to disrupt
communication by dropping or modifying data packets. In
this work, we mainly consider that the adversary is capable
of dropping data packets in a deterministic or probabilistic
way. This type of attack leads to lack of availability of
the network and constitutes a denial of service (DoS) attack.
The DoS attack affects significantly some QoS requirements,
such as end-to-end delay and packet delivery ratio. Thus, in
order to support time-critical applications, the traffic allocation
mechanisms should be resilient to these types of attacks. In
general, the notion of trust can also address different types
of attacks, such as the modification or fabrication of data
messages. In this case, trust evaluation should incorporate
authentication or inspection (filtering) mechanisms (e.g. Mes-
sage Authentication Codes (MAC) or Deep Packet Inspection
(DPI) [14]) at the receiver and intermediate nodes, in order to
define the trustworthiness of a network node.
Trust Estimates: The concept of security, which we adopt to
distinguish misbehaving nodes in this work is trust. Trust is a
very critical concept not only in computer networks, but also in
various other networks that involve intelligent decisions, such
as social networks. All the connections and communications
in these networks imply the existence of trust. Trust integrates
with several components of network management, such as risk
management, access control and authentication.
Trust management is to collect, analyze and present trust
related evidence and to make assessments and decisions re-
garding trust relationships between entities in a network [15].
The collection of trust evidence and the decision of trust are
beyond the scope of this paper. We assume that there are
mechanisms to efficiently distribute trust evidence, such that
duplicates of evidence documents are stored in places where
they are most needed. Different approaches of trust evidence
distribution could be found in [16] and [17] (use of network
coding to efficiently distribute trust credentials among network
entities). Once the trust evidence is in hand, nodes could
evaluate the trustworthiness of other nodes. For instance, in
wireless environments, the monitoring mechanisms can help
detect the behaviors of neighboring nodes and thus infer
their trust values [7]. We define the trust estimated value (or
trustworthiness) of node i as νi.
There are various ways to represent trust values νi nu-
merically. In different trust schemes, continuous or discrete
numerical values are assigned to measure the level of trustwor-
thiness for a network entity. For example, in [18] the entity’s
opinion about the trustworthiness of a digital certificate is
defined as a continuous value in [0, 1]. Using the same logic
for our definition of trust, we denote that it takes a continuous
numerical value in [0, 1].
We define an update period of the trust estimates denoted
by Tupdate. During the update period, represented by the
time interval [t − Tupdate, t], the trust evaluation mechanism
provides fresh estimates of the trust values for nodes i ∈ S,
based on the interaction between network entities. Each node
evaluates trust estimates for its neighbor nodes and then the
trust mechanism propagates the trust estimates throughout the
network. Hence, at the time that we need to transmit data
packets, we use the trust estimates derived at the latest update
period.
In order to prevent significant variation in the trust estimate
νi of node i and to include memory of the trust evaluation,
we suggest using an exponential weighted moving average
(EWMA) [19] to update the trust estimate as a function of the
previous estimate, as indicated in [13]. Hence, the trust value
of node i at time t is given by
νi(t) = (1− α)νi(t− Tupdate) + ανnewi , (4)
where α ∈ [0, 1] is a constant weight indicating the relative
preference between updated and historic samples of trust
values and νnewi is the fresh estimate of trust value for node
i, given from the trust evaluation mechanism.
Given the trust values for the intermediate nodes across a
path psk, the source node s evaluates the updated aggregate
trust value for the path psk ∈ Ps. The aggregate trust value
of the path psk is denoted by tsk and can be expressed as the
product of the corresponding trust values along the path as
follows
tsk =
∏
j:(i,j)∈psk
νj (5)
Source nodes evaluate the aggregate trust values for their al-
ternative routing paths to destination ds, in order to determine
the optimal traffic allocation among the different paths.
One additional parameter that we should consider in the data
traffic allocation process is path reliability [20]. In our work,
path reliability is indicated by the corresponding aggregate
trust value tsk over the path psk, which denotes the proportion
of the allocated traffic flow that is actually received at desti-
nation node ds. Hence, in order to maintain the reliability
of the network the received traffic rate for each traffic flow
should exceed a certain threshold. We denote this threshold
for each source node s as Rthress , which is proportional to the
maximum allowable rate Rs. Thus, our allocated traffic rate
for each source node should satisfy the reliability constraint
expressed as ∑
psk∈Ps
tskxsk ≥ Rthress , ∀s ∈ S (6)
The convex set Xs of feasible traffic rate vectors for source
node s should also satisfy the above reliability constraint.
C. Interference model and capacity region
In this subsection, we describe the interference model and
the feasible capacity region. In order to model interference
among wireless links of our original wireless multihop net-
work, we use the concept of the conflict graph introduced
in [21]. The conflict graph captures the contention relations
among the links. Each vertex in the conflict graph indicates a
wireless link and each edge indicates the interference between
the two corresponding links.
We can detect all the independent sets of vertices in the
conflict graph. We denote an independent set of links by e.
The independent set e can be represented as a |L|×1 capacity
vector re. The element rei,j is expressed as
rei,j =
{
ci,j , , if (i, j) ∈ e.
0 , otherwise.
(7)
The links that belong in an independent set do not interfere and
are allowed to transmit simultaneously. The feasible capacity
region Λ [2] is defined as the convex hull of these capacity
vectors and is expressed as
Λ =
{
r : r =
∑
e
βer
e, βe ≥ 0,
∑
e
βe = 1
}
(8)
Hence, the scheduling constraint indicates that the allocated
capacity vector from the scheduling process, denoted by cˆ,
should satisfy cˆ ∈ Λ.
IV. NETWORK UTILITY MAXIMIZATION FORMULATION
In this section, we present the optimization framework
for trust-aware network utility maximization (NUM), in the
case that the network nodes have an updated estimate of
trust values. We first develop a set of constraints imposed
to our utility optimization problem. These constraints are
related to capacity of wireless links, average end-to-end delay
and scheduling. Then, we formulate the trust-aware utility
optimization problem, which gives an optimal solution to the
traffic flow allocation problem.
A. Optimization Constraints
Link Capacity constraint: To define capacity constraints we
first introduce the link capacity margin optimization variables,
which were initially introduced in [8] and [11], in order to
capture the imposed delay constraints. We denote by σi,j or
simply σ`, the link capacity margin of link (i, j) ∈ L. Link
capacity margin is defined as the difference between scheduled
(allocated) capacity of a wireless link and the maximum
allowable traffic flow passing though it. Link capacity margin
is used to control link delay and therefore the average end-to-
end delay.
We also need to take into account our trust estimates for
the capacity constraints of each link (i, j) ∈ L. Based on the
capabilities of the malicious nodes, described in Section III-B,
the initially allocated traffic rate xsk can be significantly
reduced at malicious intermediate nodes because of dropping
attacks. The decrease of the traffic rate is proportional to the
aggregate trust value of the selected path. To be more specific,
the decrease of the rate observed at an intermediate node is
proportional to the aggregate trust value up to this intermediate
node. Let p(i,j)sk denote the sub-path of psk from source node s
to the intermediate node j through link (i, j) ∈ psk. Then the
traffic rate forwarded by intermediate node j ∈ N is computed
by t(i,j)sk xsk, where t
(i,j)
sk is evaluated as the product of trust
estimates over the sub-path p(i,j)sk , given by Eq. (5).
Hence, the capacity constraint associated with each wireless
link (i, j) ∈ L is formulated as follows∑
s∈S
∑
k:(i,j)∈psk
t
(i,j)
sk xsk ≤ cˆi,j − σi,j , ∀(i, j) ∈ L, (9)
where cˆi,j is the capacity allocated to the wireless link (i, j) ∈
L.
To define the different sub-paths’ aggregate trust values, we
denote by Ts the Ps × |L| aggregate trust incidence matrix
for source s, with rows indexed by the alternative paths psk
and columns indexed by links (i, j). If a link (i, j) does not
belong to any of the possible paths psk for source s, then
the corresponding entry of the incidence matrix is equal to
0. The element t(psk, (i, j)) or otherwise t
(i,j)
sk for row psk
and column (i, j) of Ts denotes the aggregate trust value of a
possible sub-path p(i,j)sk of path psk and is given by
t(psk, (i, j)) =

∏
j′ :(i′ ,j′ )∈p(i,j)sk
νj′ , if (i, j) ∈ psk
0 , otherwise
(10)
Average end-to-end delay constraint: By using the link
margin variables σi,j , we define as φ(σi,j) the delay of link
(i, j) ∈ L. The function φ(·) is typically a strictly convex,
nonnegative valued, function of σ. The packet arrival process
model determines the way that φ(·) depends on σi,j . As
described in [8] and [11], for Poisson process arrival, we have
φ(σi,j) = φi,j =
1
σi,j
(11)
We define by φ(σ) the vector that has components the delay
of all links of the network.
Delay constraints indicate the QoS requirements imposed
to a specific traffic flow. Traffic flows that serve time-critical
applications should have strict delay constraints. The end-to-
end delay is expressed by adding the link delays for each of
the links over path psk of source node s. We denote the upper
bound average delay constraint for each of the multiple paths
of the source node s as Ds > 0. Hence, we have that the
average end-to-end delay constraint for every source node s
is given by (using the routing matrix expressed in Eq. (3))
Rsφ(σ) ≤ 1Ds, ∀s ∈ S (12)
Scheduling constraint: The capacity cˆi,j allocated to the
wireless link (i, j) should lie on the capacity region specified
by Λ, which we describe in Sec. III-C. Hence, our scheduling
constraint is expressed as
cˆ ∈ Λ (13)
B. Utility Optimization
To determine the optimal traffic rate allocation to the dif-
ferent paths Ps, each source s chooses a utility function Us(·)
that evaluates the total data rate delivered to the destination
ds. Utility functions Us(·) are chosen to be strictly concave,
continuous, monotonically increasing and twice differentiable.
Trust estimates for the different paths psk of a source node
(defined in Sec. III-B) should be incorporated to the selected
utility function Us(·). Source nodes should obtain greater
utility when they decide to allocate higher traffic rate through
routing paths with higher aggregate trust value tsk. Hence, the
utility function for each source node s ∈ S can be selected as
Us(xs) =
∑
psk∈Ps
(
tsk log (xsk)
)
(14)
The primal utility optimization problem formulation, based
on the capacity, average end-to-end delay and scheduling
constraints described in Eq. (9), (12) and (13), is given by
max
x,σ,cˆ
∑
s∈S
Us(xs) (15a)
s. t.
∑
s∈S
∑
k:(i,j)∈psk
t
(i,j)
sk xsk ≤ cˆi,j − σi,j ,∀(i, j) (15b)
Rsφ(σ) ≤ 1Ds, ∀s ∈ S (15c)
0 ≤ 1Txs ≤ Rs, ∀s ∈ S (15d)∑
psk∈Ps
tskxsk ≥ Rthress , ∀s ∈ S (15e)
cˆ ∈ Λ (15f)
The trust-aware utility optimization problem is a strongly
convex optimization problem, due to the strict concavity
assumption of Us(·) and the convexity of the capacity region.
Therefore, there exists a unique optimal solution for the above
primal problem, which we refer to as (x∗, σ∗, cˆ∗).
V. DUAL DECOMPOSITION ALGORITHM
In this section, we solve the utility optimization problem de-
scribed in Eq. (15a) by applying dual decomposition [9], [22].
The decomposition of the optimization problem provides dis-
tributed algorithms, which solve the underlying optimization
problem. We note that strong duality holds for our optimization
problem (duality gap is zero) and thus we can solve it through
its dual function.
We define the Lagrange multipliers (dual variables) asso-
ciated with the capacity and average end-to-end delay con-
straints. Let λ denote the |L| × 1 vector of link prices (dual
variables) λi,j (otherwise denoted by λ`) associated with the
capacity constraints for each wireless link. Also, let µs denote
the Ps × 1 vector of dual variables µsk associated with the
average end-to-end delay constraints imposed to every traffic
flow s ∈ S.
In order to introduce the dual problem, we define the partial
Lagrangian L(x, σ, cˆ, λ, µ) of the optimization problem by
using the inequality constraints given from Eq. (15b) and (15c)
L(x, σ, cˆ, λ, µ) =∑
s∈S
Us(xs)−
∑
(i,j)∈L
λi,j
(∑
s∈S
∑
k:(i,j)∈psk
(
t
(i,j)
sk xsk
)
−cˆi,j+σi,j
)
−
∑
s∈S
µTs
(
Rsφ(σ)− 1Ds
)
=
∑
s∈S
(
Us(xs)−
∑
(i,j)∈L
λi,j
∑
k:(i,j)∈psk
(
t
(i,j)
sk xsk
))
−
∑
(i,j)∈L
(
φi,j
(∑
s∈S
∑
k:(i,j)∈psk
µsk[(Rs)k(i,j)]
)
+ λi,jσi,j
)
+ λT cˆ+
∑
s∈S
µTs 1Ds =∑
s∈S
(
Us(xs)− (λs)TT Ts xs
)
−
∑
(i,j)∈L
(
φi,jµ
(i,j) + λi,jσi,j
)
+ λT cˆ+
∑
s∈S
µTs 1Ds, (16)
where λs is a sub-vector of the λ dual variable and is
associated with the constraint in Eq. (15b). It defines the |L|×1
column link price vector related to the links that belong to any
of the paths psk ∈ Ps of a particular source node s and is given
by
λsi,j =
{
λi,j , if (i, j) ∈ ∪
psk∈Ps
psk
0 , otherwise
(17)
and µ(i,j) =
∑
s∈S
∑
k:(i,j)∈psk µsk[(Rs)k(i,j)] denotes the
combination of dual variables µ, which are related to a specific
link (i, j) and is associated with the constraint (15c).
The dual objective function h(·) is then expressed as
h(λ, µ) = sup
x∈X
{∑
s∈S
(
Us(xs)− (λs)TT Ts xs
)}
(18a)
+ sup
σ≥0
{
−
∑
(i,j)∈L
(
φi,jµ
(i,j) + λi,jσi,j
)}
(18b)
+ sup
cˆ∈Λ
{
λT cˆ
}
(18c)
+
∑
s∈S
µTs 1Ds (18d)
The dual optimization problem is defined by minimizing the
dual objective function [23] over the dual vector variables λ
and µ as follows
min
λ≥0,µ≥0
h(λ, µ) (19)
For given dual variables λ and µ, we can identify in
the above equation of h(λ, µ) three decoupled maximization
problems which we can solve separately. These three problems
correspond to source rate control in Eq. (18a), average end-
to-end delay control in Eq. (18b), and scheduling in Eq. (18c)
respectively.
By solving these three independent optimization problems
we can derive the optimal values for the primal optimiza-
tion problem x∗(λ, ν), σ∗(λ, µ) and cˆ∗(λ, µ) (described in
Eq. (15a)). Given these values, we can then solve the dual
problem by minimizing h(λ, µ) over λ, µ ≥ 0. There is no
duality gap between the primal and the dual, because the
capacity region Λ [2], [21] is a convex set.
In the following subsections, we describe the decomposition
of the dual objective function that leads to the cross-layer
optimization problem and we specify the optimal solutions
by solving these independent subproblems.
A. Source rate control
Based on the dual decomposition the traffic rate vector
of source node s is determined by the first maximization
subproblem in Eq. (18a). Us(·) is a strictly concave scalar
function of the rate vector variable xs. The maximization
problem in (18a) is maximization of a concave function subject
to the convex constraints (15d) and (15e). Thus, it has a
unique solution. Us(·) is continuously differentiable. Hence,
the maximum will be given by the numerical solution of the
equation
∇Us(x∗s) = Tsλs, ∀s ∈ S (20)
as long as the resulting solution for x∗s is in the interior of
the constraint set defined by (15d) and (15e). Otherwise the
solution will lie at the corners of the constrained set defined
by (15d) and (15e).
It is important to note that each source node s is able to
adjust its data rate vector using its local observations on the
link prices λi,j across the links of its multiple routing paths
and the aggregate trust values of the different paths and their
respective sub-paths.
B. Average End-to-End Delay Control
The second subproblem of the dual decomposition described
in Eq. (18b) is related to average end-to-end delay control
based on the optimal values for the link capacity margin σi,j .
Eq. (18b) is a strictly convex, minimization problem, subject
to the constraint that all sigma are nonnegative. Thus, it has a
unique solution. Function φ(·) is a continuously differentiable
function. Hence, the optimal values of σ∗i,j are obtained by
solving the equations numerically
dφ
dσ
(σ∗i,j)µ
(i,j) = −λi,j , ∀(i, j) ∈ L (21)
By Eq. (21), we observe that the updated dual variable
related to the corresponding wireless link is needed. Thus, ex-
plicit/implicit exchange of dual variables between the different
data sources is enabled.
C. Scheduling policy
The third problem of the dual decomposition determines
the scheduling policy. The optimal value for the allocated link
capacity cˆ∗i,j is given by Eq. (18c)
cˆ∗i,j = argmax
cˆi,j∈Λ
∑
(i,j)∈L
λi,j cˆi,j (22)
We need to find a scheduling policy so that the aggregate
link weight
∑
(i,j)∈L λi,j cˆi,j could be maximized. The solu-
tion to this scheduling subproblem is based on the maximum
weight scheduling policy introduced in [8]. This policy is
described in Alg. 1.
Algorithm 1 Maximum-Weight Scheduling Policy [8]
1: Start scheduling timer
2: while Timer is ON do
3: if i has been scheduled by any of its neighboring nodes
then
4: Send messages to notify all nodes in its interference
set and stop the process.
5: else
6: Each incident link (i, j) is assigned a weight λi,j cˆi,j .
7: Find a link with the maximum weight among all
incident links.
8: if link (i, j) is found then
9: Schedule the link with the effective allocated ca-
pacity cˆi,j .
10: Notify all neighbors in the interference set.
11: else
12: Stop the process
13: end if
14: end if
15: end while
D. Distributed Algorithm
In this section, we describe the distributed algorithm that
solves the network utility optimization problem. Our solution
is based on subgradient descent iterative methods for the
update of the dual variables. We first compute the subgradient
of the dual function with respect to each of the dual variables
and then we propose our distributed algorithm.
The subgradient of h(λ, µ) with respect to dual variable λi,j
is given by
∂h
∂λi,j
= cˆi,j −
∑
s∈S
∑
k:(i,j)∈psk
(
t
(i,j)
sk xsk
)
− σi,j ,∀(i, j) (23)
The subgradient of h(λ, µ) with respect to dual variable µsk,
which is related to source node s and its respective routing
path psk, is expressed as
∂h
∂µsk
= Ds −
∑
(i,j)∈L
φi,j(Rs)k(i,j),∀psk ∈ Ps,∀s (24)
In order to solve the dual problem of Eq. (19), we use
a subgradient descent iteration method [23] to update at
each iteration n the dual variables (Lagrangian multipliers)
as follows
λ
(n+1)
i,j =
{
λ
(n)
i,j − γ
(
cˆ
(n)
i,j −
−
∑
s∈S
∑
k:(i,j)∈psk
(
t
(i,j)
sk x
(n)
sk
)
− σ(n)i,j
)}+
(25)
µ
(n+1)
sk =
{
µ
(n)
sk −γ
(
Ds−
∑
(i,j)∈L
φ(σ
(n)
i,j )(Rs)k(i,j)
)}+
,
(26)
where γ is a positive step-size that ensures convergence of the
iterative solution (e.g. γ = 0.01) and (v)+ = max(0, v) is the
projection to the non-negative value.
Based on the primal and dual variable updates of
Eq. (20), (21), (22), (25) and (26), we propose a distributed
optimization algorithm, described below in Alg. 2.
Algorithm 2 Distributed Cross-Layer Optimization
1: INITIALIZE primal and dual variables
2: while 1T |x(n)s − x(n−1)s | ≤  do
3: Dual Variables Update
4: Each link (i, j) updates its dual variable λi,j (Eq. (25)).
5: Each source s updates the dual variables µsk (Eq. (26)).
6: Sources exchange dual variables
7: Each source s evaluates λs,(n).
8: Each source s computes its traffic rate vector x(n)s by
solving Eq. (20).
9: Each link (i, j) evaluates µ(i,j),(n).
10: Each link (i, j) computes its σ(n)i,j by solving Eq. (21).
11: Each node performs scheduling via Eq. (22) as in [8].
12: end while
VI. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we present simulation results for our trust-
aware network utility maximization problem. Fig. 2 represents
the sample wireless network scenario. The wireless network
contains N = 8 nodes and L = 11 links, with maximum
allowable capacity ci,j chosen in [9, 11] kbps. There is one
traffic flow from s to ds, which allocates traffic to different
routing paths. Our simulation time is T = 160 time slots. The
end-to-end delay constraint for the traffic flow is Ds = 2 msec.
Fig. 2: Wireless Network Scenario
There are five different paths, where the source node s can
allocate data traffic to send to destination node ds. The paths
psk are
ps1 = {(s, 1), (1, 2), (2, ds)}
ps2 = {(s, 1), (1, 4), (4, ds)}
ps3 = {(s, 3), (3, 2), (2, ds)}
ps4 = {(s, 3), (3, 4), (4, ds)}
ps5 = {(s, 5), (5, 6), (6, ds)}
We define four trust update periods (each period is defined
every Tupdate time slots), in order to show the behavior of
our approach for different trust values. For the simulations, we
define Tupdate = T/4 = 40 time slots. Node trust estimates νi
change dynamically at every update period, based on the trust
evaluation mechanism. The different node trust values that we
obtain from the trust evaluation mechanism for each of the
four update periods are shown at the matrix below
ν =

s 1 2 3 4 5 6 ds
1 1 1 0.7 1 0.7 0.5 1
1 0.9 0.9 0.5 0.9 0.2 0.2 1
1 0.9 0.9 0.3 0.7 0.1 0.1 1
1 0.9 0.9 0.2 0.5 0.1 0.1 1
 (27)
Trust values are adjusted using the EWMA algorithm ex-
pressed in Eq. (4), in order to prevent significant variations in
the trust estimates over subsequent trust update periods. For
our simulation, the EWMA algorithm uses α = 0.8 to give
more significance to the latest update.
Given the trust values estimates in Matrix (27), we can
notice that path ps5 contains untrusted (malicious) nodes and
should ideally be excluded from the traffic rate assignment.
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Fig. 3: Average Traffic Rate over paths for different maximum rates Rs
In addition, node 3 is detected to be malicious and hence our
mechanism should ideally assign significantly less traffic to
the paths ps3 and ps4 that contain this node. Finally, node 4
obtains a low trust value estimate at the last update period,
which should lead to decrease in the traffic rate assignment
even for path ps2 that contains this node.
Figures 3a and 3b present the numerical results of the aver-
age traffic rate allocation for two different cases of maximum
allowable traffic rateRs (with the corresponding error bars). In
the case of Rs = 10 kbps, the maximum traffic rate is close to
the maximum allowable capacity of the wireless links, while
in the case of Rs = 14 kbps, the maximum traffic rate is
greater than the maximum capacity of the links. We observe
that in both cases the traffic rate assigned to each routing path
changes at every update period based on the trust estimates.
Our algorithm assigns to the path ps1 the maximum traffic rate,
since it contains trusted nodes and to the path ps5 the lowest
traffic rate, because it consists of untrusted nodes. For the rest
of the paths, the traffic rate is being adjusted according to trust
estimates of every update period. We also observe that in the
case of Rs = 14, more traffic rate is allocated to untrusted
paths to cover the demand.
Link capacity margins σi,j for some links of our wireless
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Fig. 4: Average Link Margin in wireless links over time
network, in the case of Rs = 10 and Rs = 14, are presented
in Figure 4a and Figure 4b respectively. Link capacity margin
is related with the average delay, since higher capacity margin
indicates lower link delay and thus lower end-to-end delay. In
our scenario, link 1 has the lowest capacity margin, because
our scheme allocates significantly high traffic rate to this link.
In addition, we notice that links belonging to untrusted paths
have high capacity link margin (e.g. link 7 and 11), since
they do not relay high data traffic. We also observe that in the
case of higher maximum data rate, the link margin takes lower
values at the more congested links, because of the higher traffic
rate that should be allocated. Links that belong to untrusted
paths, such as link 5, are being allocated more traffic rate in
the case of higher data rate, in order to satisfy the underlying
delay requirements. In general, the capacity margin is being
adjusted in order to attain the delay constraints of the traffic
flow, which in our scenario are being satisfied, even if our
scheme has to reduce significantly the capacity margin of some
wireless links.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we investigated an important application of
performance and security tradeoff by introducing security
considerations in the cross layer design of network protocols
via network utility maximization (NUM). The specific concept
of security we used is trust. Users get higher utility by
transmitting data through nodes of higher trust values. Thus,
trust values should be taken into account as parameters in
the optimization problem, so that the resulting trust-aware
protocols are resilient to network failures and to possible
attacks. We also incorporated delay constraints in the utility
optimization problem to capture QoS requirements. Finally,
we proposed a distributed algorithm that achieves network
utility maximization. As part of future work, we plan to
investigate how dynamic changes in trust values affect the
utility optimization problem, and to evaluate our approach in
large scale scenarios.
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